Until relatively recently, policing operated primarily in a local dimension. While there were always exceptions, crime tended to be generated from within a limited area; most police officers almost never came into contact with colleagues from distant jurisdictions; and knowledge about policing was generally based on local experiences. Now, the average police officer’s operating environment encompasses much broader horizons: crime threats are increasingly global and so police routinely deal with transnational and international issues such as terrorism, e-crime, and human trafficking; officers occasionally find themselves operating on foreign soil, either as part of international investigations, or assigned to one of the increasing number of police contingents working abroad; and police agencies are now measured by international standards of good practice, as knowledge about policing flows freely between countries. Law enforcement has witnessed the same compression of space and time that the current wave of globalisation has imposed on other aspects of society.

For the management of Australian police agencies, this globalisation implies a number of key consequences. Officers at all levels must become conversant with wider realities. They need to understand how policing operates in jurisdictions they are likely to have contact with, and also how shifts in the global political, social and economic landscape are likely to impact on policing in their jurisdiction. This chapter briefly examines the new global security environment and then explores three key areas of the international dimension of policing:

- comparative policing and the creation of international ‘good practice’;
- cooperative efforts to respond to emerging transnational and international crime threats; and
- peace operations and capacity building in post-conflict and transitional societies.
These themes are examined against the backdrop of the changing imperatives for police managers and leaders to build the organisational capacity needed to operate in a global environment.

Globalisation, crime and policing

Since the late 1980s the world has experienced a new wave of globalisation resulting from a combination of economic and political integration, the widespread use of new communication technologies and cheaper means of transportation. Whether the current globalisation is in fact unprecedented in its level of economic integration, and what its impact will ultimately be is still widely debated. While some authors claim that the new globalisation signals the death knell for nations, others note that nations have survived earlier globalisation processes and that they continue to be the strongest political entities (Firth 2005). National authority may be under siege from global market forces and supranational structures, but it has also been enhanced by concerns for control over sovereignty, the continued strength of national identities, and the failure to produce global institutions that can deliver the same effectiveness, decisiveness and accountability as national-level governments (Bislev 2004; Loader 2004). Similarly, there are competing claims regarding any economic benefits for nations, regions and even individuals.

Notwithstanding such debates about political and economic impacts, there is little doubt that the current wave of globalisation has resulted in new cross-border flows and networks, some of which have had criminogenic consequences that have generated new security concerns (Loader 2004). The mobility of people, money, ideas and commodities has provided new opportunity for crime and any benefits gained by legal economies are also matched by those in illegal economies, criminal enterprises, and terrorist networks, as the world is moving towards a ‘single market’ for crime and disorder. Sovereign States are finding that their capacity to deliver order and security is increasingly undermined by global forces (Grabosky 1998; Loader 2004).

In western industrialised democracies, the new security environment has developed concurrently with pressures to reduce the size of the State and to pluralise service delivery. Globalisation has facilitated the spread of ideas such as New Public Management and Integrated Governance which have lead to the profound transformation of how governments conduct all public services, at the same time that aspirations for greater private security have transformed how important sectors of society are policed (Bislev 2004). Industrialised democracies were characterised in the post-Second World War period as ‘welfare States’ that sought to secure the wellbeing of their citizens, but increasingly they are now also conceptualised through a framework of ‘risk’. Wellbeing in itself is no longer sufficient, and the governments of these nations must now also guarantee security for their citizens and protect against external threats. An integral part of the reduction of the
State has been the increasing privatisation of public goods and services and in policing there has been an explosion in the use of private security, both locally and on the international scene.

Nation-States are ceding their authority over policing both upward and downward as policing is being restructured by multilateralisation within countries and supranationalisation among countries (Bayley and Shearing 2001). National law enforcement agencies strengthen relations with their counterparts in other countries, undertake joint operations, exchange information, and share facilities through police-specific institutions such as Interpol, at the same time as international institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations are assuming continually greater policing responsibilities. Moreover, development and funding agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development Program now require recipient nations to reform policing as a condition for receiving assistance. The need to construct security at more encompassing levels is driving the move to create supranational structures for policing for much the same reasons that existing nation-States were created out of previously sovereign principalities, estates, kingdoms, cities, and small countries (Bayley and Shearing 2001).

**Comparative policing**

The structure and style of policing is the outcome of specific political, legal and cultural histories, and there are considerable differences between countries in how policing responsibilities are structured and how they are distributed between public and private institutions (Pakes 2004; Mawby 2003; Reichel 1999). The mandate and operational framework of any particular police agency may be significantly different from that of its ‘equivalent’ in another country and such differences extend to the structuring of relationships between the public and private entities with responsibilities for crime prevention, security and public safety.

There are also significant differences in the use of key operational concepts, which are then complicated even further when they are translated from one language to another. In English-speaking industrialised countries, community policing has been a core operating principle for the last two decades. The equivalent term in French is *police de proximité* (similar terms are used in most Latin-based languages), which translates back into English as ‘proximity’ or ‘close’ policing. What impact does such a linguistic difference have when English-speaking police compare notes with their colleagues in French, Portuguese or Spanish-speaking countries? (What, for example, happens to all the English-language debates about ‘what is community’?) Moreover, there are real questions of how such strategies are applied in countries where community may be defined primarily by social class or ethnic affiliation, or where there is significant lack of *proximité* – social and physical – between the police and the population.
INTERNATIONAL POLICING

While globalisation is leading to a certain convergence in policing structures and styles, the reality remains that anyone seeking to understand global law enforcement structures must begin with a base of understanding of different policing models. The major dimensions of those differences are the following.

Military vs civilian models

In Britain, Sir Robert Peel established modern policing in 1829 as a purposely civilian organisation, separated from the government under the Westminster system. In contrast, policing authority in many countries is derived more exclusively from the State – the police are servants of the State and not of the people – and tend to be associated more with the military function of government. Militarised police operate with military rank structures (General, Lieutenant, Private, etc) and adhere to strict chains of command, while more civilian police use civilian rank structures (Supervisors, Inspector, Constable and Agent, etc) and have governance structures and practices more along the lines of other public services. In some instances, militarised police may act in a repressive manner and are regarded by the population almost as an occupying force, but there is also a misconception that militarised policing is by definition undemocratic. Authoritarian regimes do rely on militarised policing, but militarised police services are also present in democracies such as Italy and France, where the Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie are under the Ministry of Defence.

Centralised vs decentralised structured

In highly centralised systems there is only one police agency, which usually has some form of regional management structure that gives only limited independence to the regions. Decentralised systems have multiple police agencies, which may be the result of horizontal decentralisation (parallel agencies at the same level) or vertical (based on regions or levels of government). While Australia is decentralised as a result of the federal system, each State is highly centralised with only one single agency operating throughout the State. In contrast many countries have a number of parallel agencies at each level of government. Italy has six national police forces that operate throughout the country – two with general duties (Carabinieri and Polizia di Stato) and four with specific duties (including Guardia di Finanza that polices fiscal crimes and smuggling) - and there are also provincial and municipal police. The US has a highly decentralised system with more than 20,000 law enforcement agencies around the country operating at the federal, State, county, city and township level, as well as in special districts such as parks and universities.

The reasons for having multiple police agencies vary. They may be a result of the historic independence of different political divisions, or the perceived need for specialisation in policing. Multiple agencies may also be
considered necessary to have ‘checks and balances’ between law enforce-
ment agencies.

Division of responsibilities between criminal justice and public
safety agencies

The powers conferred on a police agency and the role that the police play in
the broader criminal justice system varies under different legal traditions. In
Australia, the police carry out the investigation of an offence and the public
prosecutor only acts on finalised investigations; in contrast, the Swedish
police share the initiative of the investigation with the prosecutor, while in
France and Spain, a third party, the investigative judge, has a key role in
preparing a case for court. There are also considerable variations in the divi-
sion of responsibilities with other public safety and regulatory agencies,
such as fire departments, emergency response, and public health.

Level of economic development

The level of economical development of a country will also define the level
of service offered to the community as there are considerable costs associ-
ated with ensuring a 24-hour, 7-day response capability. In countries where
this beyond the means of the economy, some alternatives might exist to fill
the void, through either traditional community arrangements or through
private security for those who can afford it, but often policing is simply
absent. The level of economic development is also reflected in the education
levels of the recruits, the training they receive, the wages police earn (with
consequent impact on discipline, morale and exposure to corruption) as well
as in the availability of sufficient equipment, technology and support ser-
vices. It may also be reflected in the role of women in policing, with women
tending to be marginalised in all but the most developed countries.

‘Cultural’ differences

The sum total of the above aspects of policing, along with a range other his-
torical, political and social factors, is often translated into an approach that
looks at the ‘cultural’ differences between police agencies (note that the
word culture here refers as much to police culture as to the broader cultural
aspects of society). The following four broad groupings can be identified
(based on the work of Mawby 2003, Reichel 1999 and others):

- **Democratic ‘Anglo-Peelian’.** Citizen-focused policing that combines
  crime control and crime prevention with a welfare and service role.
  The US version of the model is highly fragmented, leading to signi-
  ficant variations in operational approaches and relations with the
  communities served.

- **Democratic ‘Continental’.** Legitimacy tied more to government and
  law than to citizens. Policing structures tend more towards centrali-
sation and military models. Multiple agencies may exist to provide ‘checks and balances’.

- **Developing nations.** Policing operates with considerable economic constraints, with low-paid police and often without the resources to fully enforce the rule of law or control police corruption. In the most extremes cases, the national government no longer controls internal security, which is largely in the hands of private, and often rival, militias.

- **Authoritarian.** Policing is centralised and militarised, with legitimacy based on government force. Significant focus on controlling dissent which is often repressed brutally, including through torture and extra-judicial killings. Some authoritarian regimes have a religious basis and seek to strictly impose religious law.

Formal structures may be further mediated by other cultural norms and by evolving political and social contexts. Some authors speak of an ‘Asian’ approach to policing in which a centralised and militarised policing style is complemented by cultural norms that put greater emphasis on social order than on individual rights (Asian Human Rights Commission 2001). The capacity of the police to respond to the needs of citizens, as opposed to only enforcing the power of the State, depends on the rule of law being widely established and on citizen oversight over police conduct.

Globalisation has lead to a significant increase in the international flow of information about policing, as well as the increase in visits of police officers between countries and in assistance and capacity building programs for developing countries. One result is that there is greater dialogue about ‘what works’ and about good practice in policing and this has resulted in a certain convergence in approaches to policing as police agencies around the world seek to adopt the best of what they see happening in other countries. This convergence has also been promoted through the simultaneous development of responses to emerging international and transnational threats, and by increasing joint international regulation through multilateral agreements and supranational entities. The circulation of good practice has been greatly facilitated by the Internet, but often new ideas are imposed without allowing for the impact of traditional practices, indigenous cultures, or adapting them to local conditions.

**Responding to transnational and international crime**

Transnational crimes are ‘offences, the inception and effects of which involve more than one country’, while international crimes are ‘by their very nature crimes of a global calibre’ (Pakes 2004, p 141). While Pakes makes this distinction, other authors use the two terms interchangeably, or use alternate terms such as global and cross-border crime. Whichever term is used, they

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1 See for example the websites of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime and the UN Crime and Justice Research Institute.
all reflect the reality that criminals and political extremists are using the tools and consequences of globalisation to extend their reach and to create new forms of crime. New international relations have generated a greater mandate to pursue human rights violations, corruption and environmental crime, but they have also generated new political-criminal connections that corrupt governments and imperil attempts to break cycles of poverty and underdevelopment. A final dimension of transnational and international crime is the new impetus for countries to prosecute their citizens who engage in criminal activities abroad or to pursue foreigners who commit crimes from abroad against their citizens.

A small number of entirely new crimes have emerged that use the unique capabilities of information technologies, but the foremost effect of globalisation has been to provide additional means and impetus to existing cross-border criminal activities such as drug smuggling and people trafficking, and to facilitate the commission of an array of previously more ‘domestic’ activities. As political and economic impediments to travel and international transactions have been minimised, crimes such as fraud, forgery, money laundering, identity theft and commerce in illegal materials have now taken on transnational dimensions, where their prosecution is made more difficult by geographical and jurisdictional limitations and by their sheer scale (Grabosky 1998; Edwards 2004). If a paedophilia website has thousands of subscribers around the world, vast resources and complex international negotiations are needed to investigate and prosecute all those involved, particularly if the website is located in a nation that does not have the means nor will to pursue the crime.

As with all crime, the probability of victimisation as a result of international or transnational crime are filtered through the lens of the public’s fear of these crimes and the political capital associated with debates about them. Australia has been fortunate to have not yet suffered a direct terrorist attack, and the probability of being the victim of any of the new crimes is no more likely than other more traditional forms of crime. Yet, given the political salience of threats such as terrorism or the novelty of online crimes such as phishing (stealing bank passwords by creating false websites), and subsequent media focus on them, considerable resources are being allocated to addressing them. There is a real danger of budgets being skewed to focus on new issues while more traditional crime issues are neglected, but transnational and international crime inescapably imply more work for law enforcement agencies in Australia and they require new levels of international cooperation.

Police agencies have options to respond through domestic means, through strengthening existing networks and structures, and through the establishment of new cooperative structures and new supranational structures. Table 18.1 (opposite) lists a range of responses available to Australian law enforcement agencies.
Table 18.1: Operational responses to transnational and international crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of response</th>
<th>Possible responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Increase operational capacity by strengthening:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• internal expertise and access to new technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• cooperation with other Australian police agencies and other security and regulative agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• cooperation with foreign policy and international relations agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing international</td>
<td>• Increase cooperation with foreign police and security organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>networks</td>
<td>• Strengthen links with aid programs to assist potential source countries to increase policing capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New intergovernmental</td>
<td>• Extend bilateral and multilateral agreements on operational cooperation, extradition, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>• Create joint data bases and mutual access to intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Synchronise legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New supranational structures</td>
<td>• Create new structures for international exchange of best-practice and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Confer investigative and prosecutorial authority to supranational entities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Not all these responses are within the remit of police agencies, as they may depend more on foreign policy and international law initiatives. Therefore, to operate effectively in international and transnational spheres, police agencies must cooperate more closely with the governmental structures that handle international relations and understand how their task interfaces with related issues such as regional and global security. Currently Australia has dozens of law enforcement and security mutual assistance agreements with nations throughout the world and is a signatory to a number of supranational arrangements and UN conventions. The growing nexus between security issues and foreign aid has become cause for concern by many in the development field (Howell 2006), but from a policing perspective, it provides considerable opportunities for building relations with foreign law enforcement agencies.

Private security is also very much a growing part of transnational and international policing (Walker 2003). New ‘professional service’ and ‘risk management’ firms, that eschew the earlier models of clandestine mercenary outfits, now work openly and are awarded large UN-, government- and private contracts to work in quasi-military and civilian policing roles in inter-
national deployments and Aid programs. UN peacekeepers and UN CIVPOL (civilian police) officers are hired by, or trained by, private firms such as DynCorp, Civilian Police International Inc, Wakenhut and AEGIS. These firms also work in ‘white collar’ areas such as commercial fraud, industrial espionage and security of transnational corporations, as well as in areas previously considered to be exclusive to the public policing domain such as security of diplomatic staff, detention of irregular immigrants, and even drug enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

While international relations and cross-agency work is essential, effective responses begin at home, and the capacity of any single police agency to respond to transnational and international crime depends foremost on its internal expertise and its relations with other domestic agencies. While terrorism is an international crime, it is the State police agencies in Australia that must work with the new powers conferred on them. State police marshal the resources to monitor possible suspects and work with other State police agencies and the Australian Federal Police when suspected criminal activities are discovered.

The rise in international and transnational crime has resulted in the considerable strengthening of the role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Until the late 1990s the AFP was considered to be a relatively minor player in policing in Australia. But a combination of the need to develop operational capacity against transnational and international crime, to protect Australia against possible terrorist attacks, and to increase Australia’s capacity to send police on overseas deployments has meant that significant resources have been given to the AFP. The creation of the AFP’s Australian High Tech Crime Centre in 2003 and the International Deployment Group in 2004 are just two examples of the new AFP operations, as are its more visible presence in initiatives related to Australia’s foreign policy and aid interests. It is the AFP who represents Australian police internationally, through its networks of 86 international liaison officers posted in 26 countries, through its participation in international cooperation structures such as Interpol and regional structures such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Committee, and through its supervision of overseas policing deployments. This representational role is reinforced externally, given that many partner countries have single national police agencies and so seek a single national intermediary when working with the Australian law enforcement community.

While the post-2001 security environment has created a renewed focus on global threats and on law enforcement cooperation, there have been long standing processes of international law enforcement cooperation. At the beginning of the 20th century it was already being declared that ‘police cooperation is more prompt and thorough throughout the world than ever before’ (Sylvestre 1905 cited in Deflem 2002, p 226) and organisations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Interpol were created in 1901 and 1923 respectively. The current wave of globalisation has given new impetus to this cooperation, both directly in response to transnational and international crime, but also as a globalisation dynamic in itself. Currently
supranational policing organisations such as Interpol and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime restrict themselves to gathering and disseminating intelligence about criminal activities, working to harmonise laws and policies on criminal behaviour, providing documentation and training on comparative policing and on evaluating good practice. In contrast, Europol, established in 1992, has provided a model in which police cooperation increasingly goes beyond information exchange and joint operations by vesting operational capacity to a supranational entity. Calls for the establishment of a global police service date to well before the events of 11 September 2001 (Smolen 1995).

However, as Das and Kratcoski (2001, pp 12-25) note, there are also considerable challenges for police agencies in sustaining international cooperation. These include:

- Cooperation requires the full support of politicians and other officials who determine diplomatic relationships between countries. If political barriers are not eliminated cooperation is not possible.
- While there have been efforts to harmonise laws and procedures, nations continue to have different legal traditions, political structures and value systems. If the differences between countries are great, cooperation can be difficult.
- The amount of resources needed to maintain the cooperative agreements is in itself a considerable challenge. Maintaining an effective network of liaison officers or simply assuring the smooth operation of numerous bilateral and multilateral arrangements can be extremely costly.
- Language barriers and lack of knowledge of other countries’ customs and cultures are often cited as major factors that inhibit the effectiveness of agreements. Complaints are often voiced about the lack of understanding and sensitivity of visiting officers.
- Distrust because of suspected corruption is a major inhibitor of cooperation. If a country is known for being corrupt, it is unlikely that agreements will be seriously explored with its police organisations, or if such agreements already exist at a diplomatic level there is little chance of them being operationalised.
- Incompatible situations – whether differences in economic development or political stability – are likely to reduce the effectiveness of cooperation. More prosperous countries are generally seen as donors and less prosperous countries are seen as recipients and this imbalance may hinder true cooperation.
- A reluctance to share information continues to be a major barrier, as does the incompatibility of information systems.
Peace operations

In July 2006 Australian police agencies sent 150 officers to East Timor to help re-establish policing functions there after military intervention had quelled the violence that had broken out in May of that year. The Australian police were sent to work with an international policing contingent that included 40 New Zealand officers, 250 officers from the Royal Malaysian Police and some 120 officers from the Portuguese Republican National Guard, a paramilitary force under the Portuguese Ministry of Defence. Among the Australian contingent were 10 officers from Western Australia, the first overseas deployment from that State since it had withdrawn from a previous operation in South-East Asia because of staff shortages. The work of the foreign contingent was made even more difficult by the fact that the sectors of the East Timor police had been implicated in the May violence. A Human Rights Watch report published only a month before the outbreak of violence had warned that the East Timorese government needed to urgently address the problem of police torture and ill-treatment of detainees (Human Rights Watch 2006).

This East Timor example contains all the elements of the challenges currently facing Australian police in regard to peace operations. Australian police are increasingly being called on to participate in international deployments to re-establish functional civilian policing after military interventions have restored immediate calm, and such deployments are considerably taxing the resources of the individual agencies. Once on these deployments, Australian officers are required to work in multinational teams with officers from different policing traditions and to achieve positive outcomes they must address endemic structural problems in the existing local police, many of whom may have been implicated in the violence that lead to the crisis. As they do their job, they are often acutely aware that they earn more in one day than their local counterparts earn in a month.

The East Timor deployment falls under the rubric of ‘peace operations’, the term used to describe a range of military and police interventions that seek to restore order and create a sustainable society after a period of war or violent civil unrest. These operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement and capacity building, with these terms focusing on the three typical phases of peace operations – pacification, stabilisation, and institutionisation (Bayley 2001). During the first phase, public security is provided by the international military; in the second, it is provided either by an international police force or by an interim local police force; and in the third, it is provided by a reconstituted local police force supported through external technical, and perhaps financial, assistance. Once the initial operation has contained the worst of the violence through military intervention, the general rule is that police agencies then take the responsibility of maintaining order. In the final phase, the policing function is transferred back to the newly functioning State.
Although this chapter focuses on policing, it should also be recognised that the role of the military is changing as a result of its increased participation in peace operations and humanitarian aid. The military forces of many countries are transitioning from armed forces focused primarily on war-fighting to forces capable of also conducting a wide range of non-combat functions. The military is important not only because it is capable of wielding deadly force but also because it is equipped with disciplined personnel who can oversee peacemaking and provide humanitarian aid in difficult situations. Bayley (2001) notes that in countries where effective government has ceased to exist, the division between military and police during peace operations will be blurred. A security gap will inevitably emerge unless the military involved in the initial intervention is willing to serve as police until the international community provides a non-military alternative or competent local police are created. Despite the blurring of functions, most international entities still seek to maintain the separation, both operational and symbolic, between military operations and civilian policing.

The ultimate goal of peace operations is to fully return policing responsibility to the newly established State. One of the major challenges is how to recruit police officers, when those employed under old regimes may be compromised. Experts agree that those with records of human rights abuses must be excluded from newly formed local police, as re-established policing can quickly become discredited by association with discredited officers and old behaviour patterns may be passed on to new recruits (Bayley 2001). At the same time, former police, military and militia personnel may be the only ones who have the training needed, and if they are recruited to the new organisations they may have no other employment opportunities and will be a possible source of future criminal activity. This situation also applies to demobilised fighters who formed part of anti-government forces in the previous conflict. The temptation is to attempt to covert these forces into civilian policing organisations, but as Jackson and Lyon (2002) demonstrate through the example of Kosovo (a region of the former Yugoslavia), this can be a dangerous strategy. The armed Albanian ethnic faction in Kosovo agreed to demobilise and it eventually was transformed into the 5000-member civilian-based Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The international community envisioned an administrative role for the KPC as fire fighters and civil servants, while the commander of the KPC declared that they would be ‘one part police force, one part civil administration and one part Army of Kosovo’. Instead, the KPC soon remobilised its clandestine capabilities and began organising retaliatory violence against ethnic Serbians that returned to the region. To avoid such outcomes, it is essential to establish a fair and transparent vetting process that clearly distinguishes between those with records of abuse from others who may have simply worked for the old regimes.

Another challenge is how to effectively transfer policing expertise. Many foreign experts only have experience from their own country and try
to apply that wherever they go, even though advising on police reform requires broad knowledge of alternative models and respect for and adaptation to local culture, social conventions and political realities. The Spanish Guardia Civil, a militarised force that polices rural areas in Spain, was selected to serve as the main foreign support for the transformation of the Guatemalan security forces into a National Civilian Police. While the Spanish experts had the advantage of speaking the national language of Guatemala, subsequent evaluations of the reform project strongly criticised its over-reliance on the military model, and recommended a more democratic policing structure be established (International Peace Academy 2003). Reform programs should build on the positive policing and justice traditions that exist locally and take local ownership seriously. At the same time, reform by its very nature presumes that the systems and processes currently in use are inadequate and require modification, but changes must respond to local limitations (Mobekk 2005).

The violence in East Timor has not been the only major challenge facing Australian police deployments in recent years. In 2006 there also was civil unrest in the Solomon Islands, and in 2005 the policing component of the Enhanced Cooperation Program with Papua New Guinea (PNG) was suspended as a result of a PNG court ruling that declared the immunity of Australian police contingent to be unconstitutional. There had also been other tensions between the Australian and PNG police that culminated in a meeting of 300 local officers calling for the expulsion of the Australians. While the difficulties faced in East Timor, Solomon Islands and PNG cannot in any way be blamed solely on the actions of the foreign police deployed in these countries, they do serve as salutary lessons in the challenges inherent in peace operations.

**Conclusion: building organisational capacity in global policing**

As this chapter has detailed, the last decades have seen significant growth in the international dimension of policing. For Australian police officers this has meant new responsibilities which require a much greater understanding of global contexts and international cooperative structures as well as advanced skills in working in a range of cultural and linguistic settings. It has also put created new organisational pressures as agencies’ resources are stretched to meet new commitments and as individual officers are tempted away by new careers in international security and aid programs.

So what can Australian police agencies do? To respond effectively, individual police agencies must build the organisational capacity through a range of human resource responses. Police agencies can incorporate approaches such as productive diversity and cultural competence in order to build this capability needed to work in cross-cultural settings. These approaches have been used by Australian police agencies in the domestic context to ensure stronger relationships with ethnic communities (NPEAB
INTERNATIONAL POLICING

2000), and their application can be extended to the international context. In operations related to transnational and international crime that are carried out on home soil, there is evident overlap with the domestic use of these approaches, but similar approaches applied to a broader global context can be used to ensure that officers have the cultural knowledge, language skills and networks to work with foreign police and on overseas deployments. The knowledge, behaviours and attitudes needed to effectively work in international settings should be part of the core capacities required of officers assigned to these tasks.

There has been an assumption that police from industrialised countries are able to conduct international operations because they are well-equipped and relatively well-trained. However, as Mobekk (2005, p 24) notes, ‘con-ducting policing within domestic ‘territories is very different from doing so internationally’. Police should receive in-depth training in foreign policing systems, the cultural contexts in which they will work, the lessons learnt from past deployments, and the cross-cultural skills needed for creating trust and obtaining support in international operations. Mobekk (2005) cites the pre-deployment training offered in Australia by the AFP as an example of good practice, but there continues to be a need for coordination between police jurisdictions and with other government and private organisations to ensure that a collective organisational capacity for working in the international arena is continually developed. This capacity is built through education and training, through appropriate recruitments, but also through the management of the human resources needed to effectively deploy officers to transnational and international duties, to provide the necessary logistical and social support to them and their families, and then to re-integrate the officers into other duties when they complete such service.